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INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 1988, James Wilson entered Oakwood
Elementary School brandishing a .22-caliber revolver. Within min-
utes, he killed two young children, wounded numerous others, and
traumatized many for life. At trial, he was sentenced to death. Mr.
Wilson was not insane at the time of his killing spree. It would
seem, therefore, that he deserved harsh punishment for his actions.
What if, however, Mr. Wilson explained that he simply could not
help himself? What if we believed him? In fact, Mr. Wilson did
offer this explanation, and the South Carolina courts did believe
him. The South Carolina Supreme Court observed that Mr. Wilson
"acted under an irresistible impulse at the time of his crime."'
Nevertheless, it affirmed his sentence of death. "James Wilson
could not control his own worst impulses. Sometimes our judicial
system has the same problem."2
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and its state
counterparts stand as a bulwark against the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment? They prescribe parameters on punish-
1. State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 23 (S.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992).
2. It's Wrong to Kill the Mentally Ill, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 14, 1989, at D-6.
3. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment itself prohibits the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment for federal crimes; the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment similarly prohibits the states from extracting such punishment for
state crimes. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). See generally Arthur
E. Sutherland, Jr., Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARV. L. REV. 271 (1950)
(discussing incorporation of Eighth Amendment protections through the Fourteenth
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ment by mandating that the penalty imposed be adapted to the
severity of the crime.4 Given that the death penalty is unique
among punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that
the imposition of such a severe and irrevocable penalty must be
subjected to stringent standards.6
In recent years, many states, including South Carolina, have
created potential Eighth Amendment difficulties by adding "guilty
but mentally ill" to the list of possible verdicts in criminal cases.
In State v. Wilson,7 the Supreme Court of South Carolina bull-
dozed through the landscape of the Eighth Amendment by up-
holding a capital sentence for an individual found to be guilty of
murder but mentally ill.8 Under South Carolina law, to be con-
victed as guilty but mentally ill, the defendant must be found to
have acted under an impulse that was irresistible." By imposing
Amendment).
4. See, ag., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 382 (1910) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of cadena temporal, i.e., imprisonment that in-
cludes hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities, for the falsification of public
documents).
5. Throughout most of American history, it has been assumed for constitutional
purposes that the death penalty is a valid form of criminal punishment. This view was
explicitly recognized in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), when the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that "the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and in a
day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept
of cruelty." Ld. at 99. In 1972, however, a majority of the Supreme Court negated this
assumption of constitutionality in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Five Justices,
each writing separately, held that the death penalty, as applied, was unconstitutional in
light of the capricious application of capital punishment under a system that gave juries
broad discretion in imposing punishments. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Although some believed that Furman foreshadowed the abolition of the death pen-
alty, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 84-85 (1972), in 1976
the Court made clear that it was the manner in which capital punishment had been im-
posed, and not the penalty itself, that led to the decision in Furman. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not per se an unconstitutional
punishment); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (companion cases holding same).
6. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Given that the
imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties,
we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cas-
es."); see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (outlining Eighth
Amendment restraints against excessive punishment).
7. 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992).
8. ld. at 29.
9. The law provided: "A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the
commission of the act constituting the offense .... because of mental disease or defect
he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Act
of May 16, 1984, No. 396, § 2(A), 1984 S.C. Acts 1785, 1786 (current version at S.C.
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capital punishment on such an individual, the courts of South
Carolina have ignored the basic principle permeating Eighth
Amendment analysis of capital punishment: there should be a
direct correlation between the personal culpability of an individual
and the punishment he receives.' 0
This Note begins with an examination of two Eighth Amend-
ment constraints imposed on the application of capital punishment:
proportionality and penological justification. Part I argues that
these constraints require that the death penalty's application be
limited to those instances in which the defendant has sufficient
culpability. In order to demonstrate the way in which culpability
analysis functions, Part II surveys some of its applications within
the capital punishment context. In particular, this Part focuses on
the effect of volitional impairment on culpability by examining two
death penalty cases-Thompson v. Oklahoma," which involved a
youth, and Penry v. Lynaugh," which involved a mentally retard-
ed person. Part III details areas in which courts have applied the
involuntariness doctrine as a bar to conviction. This Part also
relates the involuntariness doctrine to the concept of volitional
impairment in order to establish its position vis-h-vis the verdict of
guilty but mentally ill. A step-by-step analysis of the label guilty
but mentally ill is offered in Part IV. This Part argues that, if
"guilty but mentally ill" connotes an irresistible impulse, a func-
tional equivalent of an involuntary act is recognized. Accordingly,
the recognition of an inability to control one's actions should
result in a proscription against application of the death penalty.
This Part also examines those instances in which the label of
guilty but mentally ill implies lesser impairments that are, nonethe-
less, substantial. The Note concludes by arguing that the de jure
recognition of volitional impairment embodied in the guilty but
mentally ill verdict is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment's
culpability requirement. As such, individuals who are convicted as
guilty but mentally ill should not be eligible for the death penalty.
CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
10. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
11. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
12. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1 3
A. Proportionality and Penological Justification
At its core, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that
is disproportionate to the severity of the crime and punishment
that is without penological justification.'5 In determining whether
a punishment is disproportionate to the severity of the crime,
Eighth Amendment analysis demands more than a superficial
examination of the magnitude of the harm the crime caused. The
Eighth Amendment requires an assessment of the defendant's
uniqueness with regard "to his personal responsibility and moral
guilt."16 This requirement mandates that a defendant be culpable
at a level sufficient to justify capital punishment. When the pres-
ence of a particular factor reveals that a defendant has not
reached this level, the sentence of death is disproportionate and,
consequently, prohibited.
In addition to requiring that punishment not be grossly dis-
proportionate to the culpability of the defendant, the Eighth
Amendment also prohibits punishment that is without penological
justification. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
death penalty is penologically justified when it serves one of two
goals: deterrence or retribution. 7 Unless the execution of a de-
fendafit will advance one of these goals, the execution "'is nothing
13. This Note focuses on the Eighth Amendment requirements of proportionality and
penological justification for capital punishment and does not inquire into historically based
forms of analysis or those centering on evolving standards of decency.
14. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
15. Id. at 183.
16. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (stating that a defendant's "punish-
ment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt"); Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (noting "the law's effort to develop a system of capital
punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual").
17. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. In Gregg, the Court also noted that incapacitation is a
rationale that has been advanced as a penological justification. Id. at 183 n.28. Although
incapacitation is a valid reason for imposing punishment and would undoubtedly "be
served by execution[,] . . . in view of the availability of imprisonment as an alternative
means of preventing the defendant from violating the law in the future, the death sen-
tence would clearly be an excessive response." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 478
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, incapacitation
has not been incorporated into the culpability analysis.
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more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment."18
As to deterrence, in Skipper v. South Carolina,19 Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
stated that "the death penalty has little deterrent force against
defendants who have reduced capatity for considered choice."'
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Indiana stated the obvious when it
said that the death penalty would not deter those defendants lack-
ing the ability to conform their conduct to the law.2 Whereas the
guilty but mentally ill defendants in Indiana presumably can be
deterred since, under Indiana's statutory definition of "mentally
ill," they do not necessarily lack the ability to conform their ac-
tions to the requirements of the law,' such a "defendant under
South Carolina law[] has in essence been found to have acted
under an irresistible impulse."' Despite the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's explicit recognition that one goal of the penal sys-
tem is "to deter those who can be deterred from acting unreason-
ably,"24 the court conspicuously omitted any reference to the de-
terrence value of Mr. Wilson's death sentence. Instead, the court
based its justification of the sentence on the retribution ratio-
nale.' Accordingly, the courts have recognized that if there is a
penological justification for the execution of guilty but mentally ill
defendants who act under an irresistible impulse, it must reside in
the retribution rationale.
Although recognizing retribution as an alternative justification
for the death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court disfavors retribu-
tion as the sole basis for its imposition.26 Accordingly, this justi-
18. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
19. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
20. Id. at 13 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11).
21. See Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909
(1987).
22. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-1-1 (Bums 1985) (" 'Mentally ill' means having a
psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior
and impairs the person's ability to function . . . .") (emphasis added).
23. State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 23 (S.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992). In
contrast to the Indiana statute, the South Carolina statute provides that the guilty but
mentally ill defendant is one who lacks the capacity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1992). For a
discussion of the differences in state statutory definitions of guilty but mentally ill, see
infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
24. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d at 24 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 25.
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183'(1976) ("Retribution is no longer the domi-
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fication for the death penalty has been limited by the principle
that retribution may only be exacted from those who are suffi-
ciently culpable.27 As with disproportion analysis, culpability is
determined through an examination of "the relevant facets of 'the
character and record of the individual offender.' ""
A death sentence will not survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny
if it is either disproportionate to the severity of the crime or lack-
ing in penological justification. Insofar as the defendant's culpabili-
ty is the determinative issue for both the disproportion standard
and the goal of retribution, culpability is ultimately dispositive for
29purposes of this analysis.
B. New Federalism Ensures the Lasting Vitality of the Culpability
Analysis
In recent years, some U.S. Supreme Court Justices have ques-
tioned whether there is, in fact, a culpability requirement inherent
in the Eighth Amendment. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,0 Justice
Scalia, in dissent, opined that the Eighth Amendment authorizes
an analysis only as to whether the punishment in question was
"forbidden under the original understanding of 'cruel and
unusual"' or forbidden as contrary to the "'evolving standards of
decency' of our national society."31 Just one year after making
this statement, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Stanford v.
Kentucky,3 again advocated an emasculation of culpability analy-
nant objective of the criminal law . . ... ") (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949)).
27. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution ratio-
nale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal offender."). As Thomas Hobbes noted:
Revenge[], (that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,) . . .without respect to the
Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another,
tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying
to no end, is vainglory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason,
tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and
is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 210 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
28. Tison, 481 U.S. at 149 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976)).
29. This observation is true even if the penological justification for the imposition of
capital punishment in a particular instance is deterrence, since the sentence still must
satisfy the proportionality requirement, which is linked to culpability.
30. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
31. Id. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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sis.3 He called for an inquiry that focused merely on whether
there was a historic or modern consensus forbidding the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a particular class of defendants.'
Although such dicta may call into question the future of the
Eighth Amendment's culpability analysis,' it certainly does not
determine the applicability of such analysis at the state level.
In many instances, Americans must learn to live with the
Supreme Court's decisions, however wrong they believe those
decisions to be because the Supreme Court often has the last
word on legal matters. When determining whether application of
the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, how-
ever, it is not necessary to accept interpretations that are contrary
to reason. As sovereign entities, states have the power to enact
their own prohibitions against what they consider to be inhumane
punishments. To mix metaphors, if the U.S. Supreme Court drops
the ball on the issue of capital punishment, state courts must step
up to the plate and make the hard decisions.36
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Delaware accepted this chal-
lenge when it determined that Article I, Section 11 of its constitu-
tion,37 independent of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution, "demands that a death sentence be proportionate to a
defendant's culpability and that it accomplish some legitimate
penological end."38 The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the
33. Id. at 378-80 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia was joined in this
portion of his opinion by three other Justices.
34. Id. at 380.
35. But see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (stating that the Court
has "firmly embraced" the disproportion and penological justification modes of analysis as
part of its determination that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional).
36. The necessity to do so was well noted by John Chipman Gray:
[T]he difference between the judges and Sir Isaac [Newton] is that a mistake by
Sir Isaac in calculating the orbit of the earth would not send it spinning round
the sun with an increased velocity; his answer to the problem would be simply
wrong; while if the judges, in investigating the reasons on which the Law
should be based, come to a wrong result, and give forth a rule which is discor-
dant with the eternal verities, it is none the less Law. The planet can safely
neglect Sir Isaac Newton, but the inhabitants thereof have got to obey the
assumed pernicious and immoral rules which the courts are laying down . .
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 101 (Roland Gray ed.,
2d ed. 1921).
37. The Delaware Constitution of 1897 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted; and in the con-
struction of jails a proper regard shall be had to the health of prisoners." DEL CONST.
of 1897, art. I, § 11.
38. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 147 (Del. 1990).
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invitation offered by Justice Brennan in an influential article,
wherein he observed that "the decisions of the Court are not, and
should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed
by counterpart provisions of state law."39 In fact, the U.S. Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized the force of Justice Brennan's
statement when it noted that "[i]t is elementary that States are
free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system
than the Federal Constitution requires."'  It is certainly possible
that other states would follow Delaware's lead if the U.S. Su-
preme Court were to abandon the culpability analysis of the
Eighth Amendment. Nearly every state has a constitutional provi-
sion that closely approximates the Eighth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.41 Many of these states could easily require
a culpability analysis on independent state constitutional grounds.
It is likely that other state courts would choose this route because
of the severity of the penalty in question,42 the deeply ingrained
nature of the concepts of proportionality43 and penological justifi-
cation, and the popularity of new federalism." Given the severity
and finality of the death penalty, judicial integrity would demand
that state judges pursue an independent path if the U.S. Supreme
Court were to eviscerate Eighth Amendment protections by drop-
ping the culpability requirement.
39. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
40. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983); see Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) ("State courts have available to them for
decision a number of sources-[including] state constitutions . . . -which are not avail-
able to us.").
41. See SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 423 (2d ed. 1973) (noting
that nineteen states prohibit cruel or unusual punishment; twenty-two prohibit cruel and
unusual punishment; and six prohibit only cruel punishment).
42. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (stating that "a sentence of
death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long").
43. The tenet that punishment must be proportionate to an individual's culpability is
a bedrock of natural law theories. Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote that punishment "de-
pends on the ability of the agent, because discipline should be adapted to each one
according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same bur-
dens should not be laid on children as on adults) .... " ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, The
Summa Theologica, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 225, 786 (Anton
C. Pegis ed., 1945).
44. See generally Robert B. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme
Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L.
REV. 19, 27 (1989) ("At last count more than 450 published state court opinions inter-
pret state constitutions as going beyond federal constitutional guarantees.").
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II. CULPABILITY ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the
death penalty itself is not unconstitutional per se, it has used the
culpability requirement inherent in the Eighth Amendment to
proscribe the use of capital punishment in certain settings. The
culpability requirement may operate to exclude the death penalty
as a punishment option for entire categories of offenses4" or
classes of people.' In each instance, capital punishment is pro-
scribed because the category of the offense or the class of defen-
dants possesses insufficient culpability.
With respect to the category of the offense, the Court drew
an important bright line around capital punishment soon after
reinstating the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia. In Coker v.
Georgia,.' the Court determined that "a sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment."'  In drawing this line, the Court
singled out the absence of the taking of human life as the factor
that made rape ineligible for classification as a capital offense.49
Thus, the culpability requirement demands that a capital offense
be defined by the result of unjustified human death.5
Eighth Amendment culpability analysis is not limited, howev-
er, to an examination of the categories of crimes that may be
classified as death-eligible. 1 The culpability standard also requires
45. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that it is unconstitu-
tional to impose the death penalty against a defendant who rapes but does not kill).
46. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state statute
criminalizing the status of addiction to drugs violated the Eighth Amendment). The Rob-
inson Court's holding that status itself may not be criminalized necessarily encompasses a
prohibition on capital punishment for drug addiction.
47. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
48. Id. at 592.
49. Id. at 598 ("Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not com-
pare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.").
50. But see The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 128 (1977)
("[Slince treason, a crime against masses of people, may cause more aggregate harm than
a single murder, the greater public injury may justify the imposition of the death penal-
ty."); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 ("[I]diots and lunatics are
not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not
even for treason itself.") (citation omitted).
51. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298 (1976) ("[I]ndividual culpabili-
1993]
96 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:87
scrutiny of the individual defendant in question.52 The caselaw
suggests that some individual traits may so diminish culpability
that the death penalty is inappropriate for persons exhibiting these
traits. 53
When a trait predominates across an entire class and directly
affects culpability, it is appropriate for the Court to consider draw-
ing a bright line around the class. In Enmund v. Florida,54 for
example, the Court examined whether an accomplice to murder
could be sentenced to death on the basis of the felony murder
doctrine. The Court noted that "[t]he focus must be on his [the
defendant's] culpability, not on that of those who committed the
[crime] and shot the victims."'55 In focusing on the culpability of
the non-triggerman in a felony murder, the Court identified two
issues as bearing on whether such a defendant could be sufficient-
ly culpable to receive the penalty of death: the defendant's actions
and the defendant's mens rea.56 Based on the confluence of the
defendant's non-triggerman status and his lack of intent to kill, the
Court found that the defendant's culpability was too limited to
allow the imposition of the death penalty. In so doing, the
Court held that the culpability requirement of the Eighth Amend-
ment barred a penalty of death when a defendant both lacked the
intent to kill and did not actually kill. 8
ty is not always measured by the category of the crime committed.") (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972)).
52. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (stating that capital sen-
tencing must focus on "the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant");
Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 286 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Before a state may impose
the uniquely severe and irrevocable sentence of death, it must 'focus on the personal
intent and culpability of the defendant himself .... "') (quoting Reddix v. Thigpen, 728
F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986); People v. Jimerson, 535
N.E.2d 889, 907 (I1. 1989) ("Imposition of the death penalty requires, as a constitutional
matter, an individualized consideration of both the offender's character and the circum-
stances of his offense."), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).
53. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(19S2).
54. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
55. Id. at 798.
56. Id. at 800. The Court found that the degree of the defendant's culpability in this
instance was defined most sharply by his "intentions, expectations, and actions." Id.
57. Id. at 801.
58. Id. at 798-801.
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL
Five years after Enmund, however, in Tison v. Arizona,59 the
Court revisited the issue of capital punishment for the non-trigger-
man in a felony murder case. In Tison, the Court abided by its
previous determination that the defendant's actions and mens rea
were the relevant factors defining the culpability of such defen-
dants. Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the line originally
drawn in Enmund had to be re-drawn. Although the, factors affect-
ing culpability had been correctly identified, the Court concluded
that they had been incorrectly weighed. The Tison court found
that non-triggermen felony murderers were eligible for the death
penalty when they manifested a "reckless indifference to human
life" and were heavily involved in the underlying felony offense. 6
The Tison Court found that the Eighth Amendment did not re-
quire as high a level of intent and involvement as had previously
been delineated in Enmund. Accordingly, the Court re-drew the
line to bring it into conformity with the strictures of the culpabili-
ty standard.
This scenario is not the only one in which the Supreme Court
has identified a confluence of factors which together establish the
level of the defendant's culpability. The Court also has explicitly
identified multiple issues in its examination of the culpability of
juvenile and mentally retarded defendants who are sentenced to
death. Most important for the guilty but mentally ill defendants
who are condemned to die, one of the factors recognized in these
cases is volitional impairment.
A. Volitional Impairment in Youth
Over the years, the Court has struggled with the issue of
whether a defendant's youthfulness may lead to such a diminished
state of culpability that a sentence of death would violate the
Eighth Amendment. This determination is complicated because
age itself is not a defining trait that speaks directly to culpability.
Rather, youthfulness serves as a proxy for two factors that are
commonly found in young people and that do affect culpability:
impaired volition and a diminished ability to plan. 1 The issue is
59. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
60. Id. at 137-38.
61. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982) ("Crimes committed by
youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they
deserve less punishment because adolescents may fhave less capacity to control their con-
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further complicated because age serves as an imperfect proxy in
determining culpability. Since some children mature at faster rates
than others, children of the same age may differ vastly in their
capacity "to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms."62 Consider, for example, the case of a youth who matures
less quickly than his peers, but whose chronological age surpasses
the age set by a bright-line test. This youth could be executed
even though his culpability was insufficient as measured by his
"capacity to control.., conduct" and his ability "to think in long-
range terms"-the true indicators of culpability for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes. Nevertheless, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
must accept the imperfect proxy of age as a constraint on the
imposition of the death penalty.63
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,6 a plurality of the U.S. Supreme
Court chose to draw a bright line at age sixteen.65 ,The plurality
relied on the decreased capacity of adolescents to control their
conduct as one of the two factors that evidenced insufficient cul-
pability.6 Justice O'Connor joined the plurality's judgment be-
cause she believed that the defendant's sentence of death must be
set aside, albeit on grounds other than insufficient culpability.6 7
Her refusal to join the plurality's opinion on culpability did not
rest on a belief that this analysis was not required. On the con-
trary, Justice O'Connor agreed that "proportionality requires a
nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness." ' Although she was willing to agree that "ado-
duct and to think in long-range terms than adults.") (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONT-
ING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
62. Id.
63. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 872 (1988) ("Doubtless at some age a line
does exist-as it has always existed in the common law-below which a juvenile can
never be considered fully responsible for murder.") (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted).
64. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
65. "[W]e ... conclud[e] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense."
Id at 838 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment and concluded
that people "who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be
executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum
age." Id at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 834-35 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing)).
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lescents are generally less blameworthy than adults who commit
similar crimes," she noted that "it does not necessarily follow that
all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that would
justify the imposition of capital punishment."'6 9
B. Volitional Impairment Among the Mentally Retarded
The same concerns for imperfect proxies that Justice
O'Connor expressed in Thompson are also evident in Penry v.
Lynaugh,0 in which the Court addressed the imposition of capital
punishment on the mentally retarded. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, examined the culpability of mentally retarded de-
fendants as a class to determine whether the Eighth Amendment
bars the use of the death penalty against them.7
In identifying the issues that are dispositive of culpability,
Justice O'Connor recognized the same proxy problem that had
existed in Thompson. That is, mental retardation is not itself a
trait that bears directly on culpability; rather, it serves as a proxy
for other factors. Justice O'Connor identified two issues that speak
directly to culpability in the case of the mentally retarded: the ca-
pacity to control one's impulses and the ability to evaluate the
consequences of one's conduct. 72
After examining the class as a whole, Justice O'Connor was
unable to conclude that mental retardation precludes capital pun-
ishment. She explained that "all mentally retarded people of [the
defendant]'s ability [do not]-by virtue of their mental retardation
alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their
personal responsibility-inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional,
and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated
with the death penalty."'73 Although four Justices agreed that the
culpability of the mentally retarded depended, in part, on their
69. Id.
70. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
71. Id at 319. "[Plunishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal defendant." Id. "Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should
reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime."
Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
72. Id. at 322. Justice O'Connor also identified a third factor-a history of childhood
abuse. This factor, however, was personal to the background of the particular defendant
in the case. It is not necessarily a defining trait of the class of mentally retarded defen-
dants.
73. Id. at 338.
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volitional capacity,74 they disagreed with Justice O'Connor's de-
termination that some members of the class of mentally retarded
defendants may be sufficiently culpable to be put to death. 5 The
implication of the Penry decision is that the Eighth Amendment
bars the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded
people who are volitionally impaired to some greater degree than
was the defendant in that case.76
III. APPLICATION OF CULPABILITY ANALYSIS WHERE
VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT IS THE SOLE FACrOR
Reduced capacity to control one's conduct, in conjunction with
other impairments, led a plurality of the Court to create a bright-
line rule against capital punishment in the age-based cases"7 and
appears to mandate a similar proscription against the death penal-
ty for defendants who are mentally retarded to a degree that is
still undetermined.' The key question for the guilty but mentally
ill defendant is whether impaired volitional capacity alone can
justify the imposition of a bright-line rule. Thompson and Penry
demonstrate that volitional impairment bears on culpability and
reflect the long-accepted tenet that free will lies at the very foun-
dation of our criminal justice system. Indeed, Justice Jackson char-
acterized the "belief in freedom of the human will and a conse-
quent ability ... to choose between good and evil" as "universal
and persistent in mature systems of law., 79
On a theoretical level, "[i]t is felt to be impolitic and unjust
to make a man answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen
74. Id. at 322. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in this part
of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
. 75. Id. at 344 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 350 (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Peter KM. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and the Mentally
Retarded Crimina" Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1211, 1233 (1990) ("Note the wording of the ruling. The implication is that sentencing to
death a criminal who is mentally retarded to a degree greater than Penry may be pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment."); see also People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 888
(Cal. 1990) ("The Supreme Court held [in Penry] that mental retardation alone did not
vitiate the need for individualized consideration of personal responsibility, and that some
mentally retarded persons do not lack the cognitive, volitional or moral capacity to act
with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.") (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).
77. See supra note 65.
78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
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otherwise."' In most situations "the practical business of govern-
ment and administration of the law [has been] obliged to proceed
on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the assump-
tion that mature and rational persons are in control of their own
conduct."'" When society recognizes that a person's free will has,
been impaired, however, the law attempts to deal with that person
in a humane way.'
In a number of instances, society has determined that a
person's control over his actions may be so impaired that the
individual should not be held accountable for the results of such
actions.' Such acts are alassified as involuntary, and the "actor"
is neither convicted nor punished. The question for the guilty but
mentally ill defendant is whether a lack of culpability should pro-
hibit imposition of the death penalty in light of society's recogni-
tion that the individual was unable to conform to the law's re-
quirements. It is not debatable that impaired volition speaks di-
rectly to culpability.' The question is whether the label of guilty
but mentally ill is a species of volitional impairment that justifies
an Eighth Amendment proscription.
A. The Involuntariness Doctrine: Recognized Instances of Volition-
al Impairment
In determining how volitional impairment should affect the
imposition of the death penalty, it is illuminating to examine other
areas of the law-to ascertain what the concept of volition in-
cludes and to provide guidance in dealing with the legal effects of
diminished volition. The American system of criminal law, for
better or for worse, proceeds on the assumption that an
individual's acts are voluntary and that individuals should be held
responsible for their actions. However, since human experience
indicates that acts are not always voluntary, the law provides ex-
ceptions to the voluntariness assumption. Insofar as the verdict of
80. Edwin R. Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARV. L. REV. 535,
546 n.38 (1917) (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881)).
81. Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 80 (1942).
82. State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 471 (R.I. 1979).
83. See infra Section III(A).
84. See supra Sections II(A)-(B); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that a defendant's capacity to make a considered
choice in regard to his actions is a factor that is "central to the fundamental justice of
execution").
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guilty but mentally ill recognizes a diminished capacity to control.
one's conduct, it is sufficiently akin to other recognized forms of
volitional impairments that the Eighth Amendment should bar
imposition of the death penalty in such cases.
Perhaps the most commonly recognized and deeply rooted
exception to the assumption of voluntariness occurs when one
individual applies physical force to another so as to directly cause
the other to move. Obviously, the second individual should not be,
and is not, held accountable for the results of his involuntary
act.' Matthew Hale outlined this archetypal scenario with the
following example: "If there be an actual forcing of a man, as if
A. by force take the arm of B. and the weapon in his hand, and
therewith stabs C. whereof he dies, this is murder in A. but B. is
not guilty."' Such an act is universally considered to be involun-
tary because of the blatancy of its involuntariness and, perhaps
most importantly, because nearly everyone has experienced such
an involuntary act-albeit not usually one resulting in a death. In-
deed, this situation is so compellingly involuntary on its face that
''such motion never has been viewed as action of the victim of the
force."' Instead, the action is attributed to the individual apply-
ing the force.
Although situations involving actual physical force are the
most easily recognized category of involuntary acts, society has
long accepted that, in other settings, people exhibit the same de-
creased capacity .to control conduct that underlies the concept of
85. For example, the Model Penal Code provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1985).
86. 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (Phila-
delphia, Robert H. Small 1847) (citation omitted); see also Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d
427, 429 (Ala. CL App. 1944) ("[A]n accusation of drunkenness in a designated public
place cannot be established by proof that the accused, while in an intoxicated condition,
was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that place by the arresting officer."); State v.
Boleyn, 328 So. 2d 95 (La. 1976) (reversing and remanding on the issue of voluntariness
because the evidence indicated that the defendant was unconscious at the time of his es-
cape from prison and that he was removed without his consent).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. at 221 (19&;) (footnote omitted).
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involuntariness. Unconsciousness is clearly such a category.' The
difficulty lies in the definition of unconsciousness. Caselaw has
come to accept that acts attributable directly to an epileptic
fugue-a type of unconsciousness-are involuntary and thus may
not be punished. 9 The courts have recognized that, as with the
application of actual physical force, "[s]urely, there must be, in the
case of the epileptic, a period of penumbra when the will is in a
state of total or partial paralysis."'  Similarly, homicides occurring
during an attack of somnolentia or somnambulism9' are treated
as involuntary acts because of their close relation to unconscious-
ness.' These cases reiterate that the key issue is not conscious-
ness per se, but rather a legitimate impairment of ability to con-
trol one's actions.
B. The Concept of Volitional Impairment
Conceptually, volition is a complex issue because it does not
exist in the same concrete way as do other elements of criminal
law, such as acts. As a result, volition is most often defined
through exclusion based on certain proxy situations. Society ac-
cepts, for example, that actual physical force, unconsciousness, and
the intermediate state between sleep and wakefulness approximate
volitional impairment closely enough to qualify as acceptable prox-
ies for volitional impairment. These proxies themselves are not,
however, the reason that the instances are classified as involuntary.
Rather, they are merely evidence or symptoms of the underlying
problem-a recognized inability to control one's conduct.93
88. Id. at 219 (1985).
89. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 1960)
(noting that "the operator of an automobile who is suddenly stricken by an illness which
he had no reason to anticipate but which renders it impossible for him to control the car
is not chargeable with negligence") (footnote omitted).
90. People v. Freeman, 142 P.2d 435, 439 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); accord People
v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956) (stating that a sudden epileptic attack, or other
sudden and disabling attack, renders one non-culpable as to results that flow from that
attack when one has no prior knowledge or warning of the condition).
91. Somnolescent and somnambulistic homicides occur when "the accused produce[s]
the harm during the period of semi-wakefulness immediately following sleep or during an
episode of sleepwalking." Sanford J. Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 645, 653 (1963).
92. See Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 193 (1879) (stating that the law only
punishes "overt acts done by responsible moral agents" and indicating that somnolentia
destroys such moral agency).
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. at 215 (1985).
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When making the factual determination of whether an individ-
ual was unable to control his actions, society must rely on its
accumulated experience to determine whether the asserted condi-
tion did in fact exist. Since we have all stepped on someone else's
foot because of a shove from behind and "have all experienced
dreams, and semi-waking not-fully-conscious states when the alarm
continues to ring in the morning,"'94 we readily accept, as a soci-
ety, that such acts are not rightfully attributable to us as individu-
als. Instead, society labels such acts as involuntary because of our
lack of control over them. In contrast, other claims of involuntari-
ness seem less plausible to society.95 Accordingly, courts hesitate
to recognize volitional impairment in the absence of societal ac-
ceptance of the explanation.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT TO THE
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANT
A. Societal Recognition of Volitional Impairment
In dealing with the issue of whether the label "guilty but
mentally ill" necessarily implies a reduced level of culpability that
should bar imposition of the death penalty, it is important to
analyze the implications of this verdict step-by-step. The first ques-
tion is whether society recognizes that a guilty but mentally ill
defendant is volitionally impaired to some degree.' In the cases
94. Norval. Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5
RE5 JUDICATAE 29, 32 (1951).
95. "Cheerfully we accept lack of consciousness of action as proof of...
involuntar[iness] . .. but indignantly reject lack of ability to control an action of which
the actor is conscious as a proof of the same thing. Perhaps it is that we don't believe
that there is an 'irresistible impulse' ..... " Id. at 32. Although this observation was
made prior to the advent of guilty but mentally ill statutes, an examination of guilty but
mentally ill cases reveals that this very disbelief in the existence of an irresistible impulse
permeates the opinions. See, eg., State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 23-24 (S.C.) ("[Tihe
irresistible impulse test is very difficult, if not impossible, to apply with accuracy. It has
been suggested that it is impossible to say that an impulse was irresistible rather than
unsuccessfully resisted, or to distinguish between the uncontrollable impulse and the im-
pulse that is not controlled.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992).
96. It is essential that society recognize volitional impairments before they are insti-
tutionalized in the law. Our criminal legal system proceeds on the assumption that human
beings have free choice until this assumption is rebutted with a societally recognized
exception. For a general discussion of the historical development of distinctions in crimi-
nal culpability, see Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpa-
bility, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 815 (1980). Robinson points out that "the history of the com-
mon law tradition . . . may be recognized as reflecting a process of continuous develop-
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of application of actual physical force, unconsciousness, and semi-
wakefulness, society considers the fit between these proxies and
the underlying rationale of loss of capacity to control actions to be
sufficient to warrant the label of involuntariness. However, when
society determines that the answer to one question-"Was the
defendant in a state of semi-wakefulness at the time of his ac-
tions?"-is an appropriate substitute for the ultimate ques-
tion---"Was the defendant able to control his actions?"-there is a
risk that the correlation of the responses will be less than per-
fect. 7 Such is not the case, however, with the class of guilty but
mentally ill defendants who acted under an irresistible impulse
arising out of their mental illnesses. For these defendants, there is
no proxy involved; they are by definition volitionally impaired.98
A verdict of guilty but mentally ill is itself recognition of volitional
impairment.
B. Relation of Volitional Impairment to Culpability
Having determined that society recognizes a claim of volition-
al impairment, the next step is to determine how that volitional
impairment relates to the minimum level of culpability required
for the imposition of capital punishment. In a number of death
penalty cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that volition
is a factor that inheres in the minimum level of culpability that
must exist in order to execute a defendant. Indeed, the capacity of
a defendant to make a considered choice is regarded as "central
to the fundamental justice of execution."'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has refused to acknowl-
edge that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill has any necessary
bearing on a defendant's culpability.1" U.S. Supreme Court pre-
ment and ...refinement of culpability distinctions." Id. at 821. He notes that "[a] later
generation may perceive additional fundamental distinctions in culpability and provide
greater application of current ones. No doubt [however] the law should not and will not
use distinctions beyond those that the [current] society considers significant." Id. at 853.
97. When a semi-wakeful defendant, claiming the exculpatory benefit of the involun-
tariness doctrine, commits an act that he had the capacity to refrain from performing,
that individual may wrongfully escape conviction due to the use of a proxy.
98. Mental illness is not a proxy. Rather, it is an attendant circumstance that must
exist along with impaired volition in order for the defendant to be classified as "guilty
but mentally ill." See infra note 107.
99. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
100. State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 25 & n.6 (S.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137
(1992).
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cedent, however, is to the contrary and clearly points to a correla-
tion between volitional impairment and reduced culpability. In
Thompson v. Oklahoma,' for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
identified the "less[ened] capacity [of adolescents] to control their
conduct" as one of two factors evidencing the reduced culpability
of juvenile defendants."w The presence of this reduced culpabili-
ty led a plurality of the Court to draw a bright line in age-based
death penalty cases.
Although it is clear that impaired volition has an impact on
culpability, the Court has not definitively articulated how severe
the impairment must be to justify an Eighth Amendment proscrip-
tion against execution. Based on Penry v. Lynaugh,' it appears
that a class of persons may be characterized by some volitional
impairment that itself does not rise to a level sufficient to trigger
an Eighth Amendment bar."° Taken together, Thompson and
Penry indicate that, to support the drawing of a bright line based
on diminished culpability, not only must a volitional impairment
exist, but it must also exceed some threshold level. It was Justice
O'Connor's inability to conclude that this threshold had been
reached that prevented the Court from drawing a bright line in
the context of mentally retarded defendants. 5
C. Effect of the Guilty but Mentally 1ll Verdict on Culpability
Since a finding of volitional impairment does not automatical-
ly give rise to a bar against capital punishment, the final step of
the culpability analysis is to ascertain whether the volitional im-
pairment indicates a level of culpability that is insufficient to sup-
port a sentence of death. If it does, then the verdict of guilty but
mentally ill mandates a prohibition against the application of capi-
tal punishment. At this point, it is helpful to distinguish between
the various meanings of the label "guilty but mentally ill" in the
different states."t6 Roughly speaking, there are two categories of
101. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
102. Id. at 834-35 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982)).
103. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
104. In Penry, Justice O'Connor recognized that the class of mentally retarded defen-
dants was characterized by a lessened ability to control impulses, Id. at 322-23. The
Court, however, did not believe that the defendant's volitional impairment was so severe
as to fall within the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment.
105. Id. at 338.
106. See generally Bradley D. McGraw et al., The "Guilty but Mentally 111" Plea and
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guilty but mentally ill statutes. In the first, the label connotes an
inability to control one's actions, i.e., the presence of an irresist-
ible impulse."° In the second category, the label of "guilty but
mentally ill" can attach when the impulse is less controlling."
1. Irresistible Impulses. As to the first class of defen-
dants-those who are found to be unable to control their ac-
tions-their volitional impairment rises to the level of involuntari-
ness. Their degree of volitional impairment is so great that their
actions cannot be rightfully attributed to them. Instead, society has
conceded that these defendants were deprived of the ability to
control their conduct because of a mental disease or defect. The
defendant who is found to lack the capacity to control his actions
because of a mental illness, like the epileptic who cannot control
movements because of a seizure, should not be held personally
accountable for acts resulting from his illness.1" Rather, these
Verdict: Current State of the Knowledge, 30 VILL L. REV. 117, 128-29 (1985) (outlining
the standards and definitions of guilty but mentally ill and insanity in the twelve states
that have guilty but mentally ill statutes).
107. Such is the case for the guilty but mentally ill defendant who is convicted in the
state of South Carolina. The state statute provides: "A defendant is guilty but mentally
ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense ... because of
mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
108. For example, in Illinois, a defendant "who, at the time of the commission of a
criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness ... may be
found guilty but mentally ill." ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/6-2(c) (West 1993).
The Illinois guilty but mentally ill statute defines mental illness as "a substantial disorder
of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of
the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that
he ...[was] unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. § 5/6-2(d);
see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-1-1 (Bums 1985) (indicating that guilty but mentally
ill individuals are those who have psychiatric disorders that impair ability to function);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-9-3A (Michie 1984) (indicating that guilty but mentally ill individu-
als are those who have substantial disorders that impair judgment, but not to the extent
that they cannot prevent themselves from acting).
109. In Thompson, Justice O'Connor stated that "it does not necessarily follow [from
youth itself] that all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that would justify
the imposition of capital punishment" in light of the fact that characteristics "vary widely
among different individuals of the same age." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
853-54 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Likewise, in Penry, Justice O'Connor could not
"conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability ... inevitably lack the
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated
with the death penalty." Penry, 492 U.S. at 338. The factual problems that concerned
Justice O'Connor in Thompson and Penry are not present in the case of guilty but men-
tally ill defendants who act pursuant to an irresistible impulse. Before a defendant can be
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acts should be attributed to the mental illness and classified as
involuntary.11 °
The Supreme Court of Delaware touched on this logic when
it noted that the difference "between an involuntary act and an
act caused by mental illness is, perhaps, a somewhat metaphysical
one." ' A state is not required to recognize that mental illness
causes some actions to be involuntary."' When a state does rec-
ognize such a relationship, however, executing those who acted be-
cause of their mental illness allows imposition of the death penalty
to turn on a metaphysical distinction. Because the death penalty is
severe and irrevocable, its imposition should not be made to turn
on such word games. If society is willing to recognize that an
individual did not have control over his actions, that factual deter-
mination must control the outcome, not the label-"guilty but
mentally ill" versus "involuntary act"-applied to it. Acknowledg-
ing a defendant's inability to control his actions mandates a pro-
scription against the death penalty.113
found to be guilty but mentally ill in a state where the verdict indicates an irresistible
impulse, there must be a factual finding that the individual had insufficient capacity to
conform to the requirements of the law. Se4 e.g., supra note 107.
110. See Keedy, supra note 80, at 548 ("It is difficult to see, from an abstract con-
sideration of the question, why courts should have refused to recognize irresistible im-
pulse as a defense, when it so clearly negatives a necessary element of crime, and when
they without hesitation recognized other manifestations of lack of volition."). Cf. Sentence
of Bancroft, 3 Crim. App. (S.) 119, 120 (1981) (U.K.) ("[T]here is still in every human
being a residual capacity for self-control, which the exigencies of a given situation may
call for. That must be the justification for passing a sentence of imprisonment, to recog-
nize that there is still left some degree of culpability . . ").
111. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 130 (Del. 1990) (emphasis added).
112. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 998-1000 (Mont. 1984).
113. Other cases involving the imposition of the death penalty on guilty but mentally
ill defendants have intimated that the defendant must have the capacity to conform to
the law before such a penalty may be imposed. See, e.g., Sanders, 585 A.2d at 134 (stat-
ing that ability to resist pathological impulses "provides a justification for punishment").
A proscription against the death penalty inheres in the well-accepted tenet that one can-
not be convicted for involuntary acts. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968)
(intimating that a state could not convict for murder a defendant who suffered from an
overpowering compulsion to kill); supra Section III(A). In South Carolina, a judge must
make a finding on the record that a defendant "lacked sufficient capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law" before that defendant may be found to be guilty
but mentally ill. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). Such a find-
ing, however, should bar not only execution but also conviction itself under the rationale
of Powell. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01, cmt. 1 at 215 (1985) ("People whose invol-
untary movements threaten harm to others may present a public health or safety prob-
lem, calling for therapy or even for custodial commitment; they do not [however] present
a problem of correction.").
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2. Substantial Impairment. The second class of guilty but
mentally ill defendants consists of those who act under an impair-
ment that, although substantial, does not destroy their ability to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.114 For
these defendants, it is less clear whether the verdict of guilty but
mentally ill necessarily imports a level of volitional impairment
that justifies a bright-line proscription of the death penalty. Propo-
nents of the position that such defendants should be death-eligible
point out that these individuals were not robbed of all their voli-
tional capacity. 5 As the argument goes, these defendants' im-
pulses are not unlike those created by poverty, lack of education,
or other societal pressures that may constrain a person in his
ability to act freely."6
Although it is true that guilty but mentally ill defendants, like
those who are the product of disadvantaged backgrounds, retain at
least a theoretical ability to conform to the strictures of the law,
there is one key distinction. Society has chosen to take statutory
notice of impulses arising out of mental illness. It is also critical to
note that society did not choose to categorize this volitional im-
pairment as a mere factor to be considered in sentencing. Rather,
it has recognized the need to qualify the verdict itself.
V. CONCLUSION
The acknowledgment that a person may be guilty but voli-
tionally impaired speaks directly to the assumptions underpinning
the American criminal justice system. Insofar as free will is a
predicate assumption of our legal system, any legal recognition of
the invalidity of that assumption in certain circumstances, when
coupled with a death sentence, raises profound questions."7 In-
114. See supra note 108.
115. See, e.g., Sanders, 585 A.2d at 134. ("The fact that [a guilty but mentally ill
defendant] might, in theory, have resisted his pathological impulses provides a justification
for punishment.").
116. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting the belief long held by society that an individual's background may affect his
degree of culpability).
117. In drawing a bright line against the execution of young murderers, the plurality
observed that society's creation of a juvenile court system reflected on the criminal re-
sponsibility of children, even those convicted in the adult criminal system. The Court
noted that the existence of this institution clearly implied "an absence of the basis for
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voluntariness derives its exculpatory force not from some
talismanic quality inhering in the label but rather from the societal
recognition of the absence of volition. Because of the statutory
recognition of substantially impaired volitional capacity, guilty but
mentally ill defendants differ merely in degree, not in kind, from
those who successfully raise the defense of involuntariness. Ac-
cordingly, it is curious indeed that courts have clung so religiously
to a black-and-white view of volition.
An understanding of the underlying reasons for the enactment
of guilty but mentally ill statutes provides insight into this para-
dox. "[A]s a general proposition, [these] statutes were created in
part to narrow the field of defendants who could successfully
claim a lack of culpability via the insanity defense." ''1 These
laws were legislative responses to a popular perception that too
often people were "beating the system" through use of the insani-
ty defense."' Whether this perception is accurate is, at some lev-
el, immaterial. The punishment of those who cause harm to soci-
ety strengthens the social fabric. Guilty but mentally ill. legislation
was, in large part, an effort to shore up social cohesion in the face
of perceived abuses of the legal system. 2
Although society may find it expedient to lower its standards
for conviction purposes to strengthen social cohesion, the question
of the appropriate level of punishment remains. Thus far, courts
have avoided addressing this issue directly. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, examined the irresistible impulse test
in the insanity context and determined that it is a test that "is
adult criminal accountability-the exercise of an unfettered free will." Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 835 n.41 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting SANFORD J. Fox, THE
JUVENILE COURT. ITS CONTEXT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11-12 (1967)).
118. State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 22 (S.C.), "cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992).
119. See McGraw et al., supra note 106, at 124-25 (stating that the acquittal on insan-
ity grounds of John W. Hinckley, Jr. for the shooting of President Ronald Reagan
prompted the passage of many guilty but mentally ill statutes).
120. On the issue of social cohesion, H.L.A. Hart said,
Punishing the offender is required to maintain social cohesion because the com-
mon conscience, violated by the offence, "would necessarily lose its energy if an
emotional reaction of the community [in the form of punishment] did not come
to compensate its loss, and it would result in a breakdown of social solidarity."
H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7
(1967) (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 90 (George
Simpson trans., 3d ed. 1964)) (alteration in original); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that the death penalty "is essential in an ordered
society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate
their wrongs").
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very difficult, if not impossible, to apply with accuracy." ' If
South Carolina truly does find the irresistible impulse test an
"impossible standard" to apply with accuracy, judicial integrity
demands that the court not masquerade guilty verdicts under the
label "guilty but mentally ill."'" Notwithstanding the South Car-
olina Supreme Court's assertions to the contrary,"23 there is a
qualitative difference between a verdict of guilty and a verdict of
guilty but mentally ill. Failure to import this difference from the
judgment stage to the sentencing stage is irreconcilable with the
Eighth Amendment's demand that punishment be a moral and
reasoned response to the culpability of the individual. Permitting
the execution of those whom society acknowledges to have been
volitionally impaired does not enhance an individual's responsibili-
ty for his behavior. Rather, it diminishes the value of punish-
ment.124
Although society may find it beneficial to convict a defendant
for a crime while simultaneously recognizing diminished volition,
the Eighth Amendment should bar society from imposing a sen-
tence of death on such an individual. The death penalty is the
ultimate expression of society's rage and the most exacting penalty
that may be inflicted under the American system of justice. As
such, its imposition has been tempered by the Eighth Amendment
through the culpability requirement. At its base, capital punish-
ment presupposes "the existence of a fully rational, choosing
agent."'  Admitting that a mentally ill defendant was even
somewhat volitionally impaired while simultaneously insisting that
such a defendant is deserving of the harshest retribution that soci-
ety can exact makes a mockery of the spirit of the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.2 6 Accordingly, official
121. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d at 23-24.
122. See id. at 25 (stating that a defendant who acts pursuant to an irresistible im-
pulse "is guilty, albeit 'guilty but mentally ill' ").
123. Id. at 24-25.
124. Jean Dabin, a natural law theorist, asks, "Can one conceive of the public good
turning its back on natural law and justice?" He contends that "while altogether distinct
from natural law and justice, [the public good] cannot fail to have close ties to [them]."
JEAN DABIN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW (1944), reprinted in LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF
LASK, RABRUCH AND DABiN 416 (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950).
125. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (plurality opinion) (em-
phasis added).
126. Because a sentence of death is qualitatively different from a jail sentence, "there
is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
1993]
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recognition of volitional impairment must bar capital punishment
for guilty but mentally ill defendants "to protect the dignity of
society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless ven-
geance."'1 7
the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
127. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
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